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In this paper, we introduce a new methodology designed to test the effect of new regulatory disclosure 
requirements on the disclosure threshold as predicted by the extant literature (Verrecchia (1983), Dye 
(1985)).  We apply our methodology to test the consistency between observed effects from major US 
regulation past and present (1933/1934 Securities Acts, Regulation Fair Disclosure 2000, and the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002) with regulatory objectives.  
We find unambiguous support for the consistency between theoretical predictions and regulatory 
objectives in relation to the 1933/1934 Acts.  For the current regulation we find mixed support because of 
observed differences between NYSE and NASDAQ/AMEX. We explore two possible explanations for 
this result, a small versus large firm effect versus an effect induced from the different observed strength of 
the three major exchanges/markets in terms of embracing the disclosure aspects of the new regulation.  
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Suppose that you are a regulator charged with ultimate responsibility for financial regulation that 
is designed to increase investor confidence and market stability.  How would you predict and 
measure if the regulation is efficient in meeting such statutory objectives?   Recent regulatory 
trends, faced with this type of objective, have assumed a relationship between greater mandated 
disclosure and volatility in the market, for example: 
 
“…Information would give investors more confidence about a company, as well as a ‘truer picture’ 
… which could reduce market volatility.” Alan Beller SEC, Corporate Finance Division Director, 
Northwestern Law School conference January 2003. 
 
This point is more precisely described in a theoretical paper by Kanodia (1980) 
 
“Information structure, …. determines this true distribution, and the true distribution of asset prices 
could differ substantially from one information structure to another.” 
 
When statutory objectives are tied to issues of investor confidence and market stability attention 
must shift toward measuring the impact upon of the information structure upon the higher order 
moments of the return distribution.  In this paper we introduce a new methodology that is 
designed both to measure and to interpret the impact of the regulation upon the return 
distribution itself.  We do this by drawing upon the analytical insights from the voluntary 
disclosure literature that provides testable predictions regarding the behavior of the voluntary 
disclosure threshold (Verrecchia (1983, 1990); Dye (1985, 1986); and Jung and Kwon (1988)).  
This literature is relevant to the problem of measuring the extent that regulation is meeting 
statutory objectives because it provides inferable predictions regarding how investor expectations 
respond to the regulation in markets where prices are arbitrage free and expectations are 
rational
1.  In addition, when combined with the literature on estimation risk (Clarkson, Guedes, 
and Thompson (1996), we can draw conclusions regarding the impact of the regulation upon 
systematic risk and therefore on the behavior of the cost of equity capital.  Viewed from this 
                                                  
1 The methodology introduced in this paper is designed to detect shifts in arbitrage free equilibria (e.g., O’Brien 
and Srivastava, 1991).  Interpretation of the shift further assumes rational expectations. ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2004-03 
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perspective, promoting market stability is a positive regulatory goal because it is consistent with 
creating positive incentives for new investment by lowering the cost of equity capital. 
 
Increased disclosure requirements come as an aftermath to market excesses. In this context, the 
run up of the financial markets in the 1990’s have some interesting parallels with the run up of 
the financial markets in the 1920’s.  In both cases a new economic order was discussed among 
economists.  For example, just prior to the crash of 1929, Irving Fisher asserted the following: 
 
"The nation is marching along a permanently high plateau of prosperity"  
 
as well as the now (in)famous 
"Stock prices have reached what looks like a permanent high plateau... I expect to see the stock market 
a good deal higher than it is today within a few months" 
Irving Fisher, October 15, 1929. 
Similar observations were made in the latter phase of the 1990’s expansionary cycle, (Zarnowitz 
(1999)): 
  
“Some have viewed the current business expansion in the US as the onset of the Golden Age in 
which the long-time evils of inflationary booms followed by recessions with high unemployment 
will never return….” 
 
In both cases history repeated itself and the boom in stock prices ended with major corporate 
collapses, conflicts of self interests among market professionals, entrepreneurs and investors; 
followed by calls for Government action that resulted in significant new regulation.  In each case 
government passed legislation, designed to restore investor confidence in the financial markets 
that increased obligations for mandated disclosure.   
 ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2004-03 
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The 1933/34 regulation in the US introduced sweeping new reporting standards.  For example, 
the pro-shareholder focus of the 1934 Securities Act mandated a system of timely reporting 
consisting of a combination of annual, quarterly and current reporting.  Similarly, sweeping 
regulatory amendments to the 1933/34 acts resulted in Regulation Fair Disclosure (Regulation 
FD) 2000, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002.  These Acts created stronger enforceable 
obligations for timely and non selective disclosure obligations that reflect internet and database 
capabilities available today.  Other parts of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act redefined the responsibilities 
and skill set for corporate governance such that both executives and auditors are responsible for 
evaluating companies’ internal financial controls.  That is, disclosure policy and internal controls 
have been elevated to become a significant part of a company’s corporate governance practice. 
 
In this paper, we first review and identify important economic linkages between regulatory 
trends and the impact upon investors’ expectations.  We assess economic consequences of the 
new regulation by identifying the predicted impact upon the voluntary disclosure threshold as 
identified in the disclosure literature.  This requires using a new methodology that can measure 
shifts in the disclosure threshold in a manner that permits impact upon investor expectations to 
be interpreted.  We contrast two important periods of time, 1933/34 and 2000/2002, that provide 
a unique opportunity for the independent testing of our predictions approximately 70-years apart.  
Our results broadly support conclusions that regulation had an impact upon the voluntary 
threshold in a manner that is consistent with predictions from the theory.  However, the results 
from recent regulatory trends also identify potentially important interactions that exist between 
the regulation and different responses to implementing it.  That is, history has not precisely 
repeated itself! 
 
This paper is structured as follows. Section I reviews current international trends in models for 
regulation; Section II reviews the literature on the impact of mandated disclosure on stock prices; 
Section III focuses on the theory and predictions that are tested in this current paper; Section IV 
discusses our methodology and Section V presents our results. Finally, Section VI concludes 
with further directions for research.  ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2004-03 
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Section I: Trends in Models of Financial Regulation 
Theories of financial regulation have been extensively reviewed in two sources (Dale and Wolfe 
(1998), Goodhart, Hartmann, Llewellyn, Rojas-Suárez and Weisbrod (1998)) but no single 
model has emerged as dominant.  In the US a specialist regulator model resulted from the 70 
year old legislation from the Securities and Exchange Act, 1934.  The Securities and Exchange 
Commission created by this Act has, over the years, been the subject of periodic criticism on the 
grounds of ineptitude and ineffectiveness (Stigler (1964)), and defended on both counts (Friend 
and Herman (1964)).   In conjunction with the SEC, state regulators maintain a watchdog role - a 
practice subject to much controversy today.  Critics of this decentralized system maintain that the 
U.S. securities market should have one “watchdog” - the SEC
2.  This would result in a similar 
situation to the UK, where the powers for a single regulatory body, the Financial Services 
Authority (FSA), flow from the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 that received royal 
assent on June 14, 2000. 
 
Although the sweeping reforms to mandated disclosure in the US took place with the Securities 
Act 1934 which put into place a system of Annual reports (Form 10-K), Quarterly reports (Form 
10-Q), and current reports (Form 8 -K), t he SEC recently embraced again a  stronger pro-
shareholder value agenda.  Regulation FD that took effect on October 23, 2000 pursues an 
aggressive equal access approach to voluntary public disclosures.  Public disclosure can be via 
the Form 8-K or by other methods that are reasonably designed to effect non-exclusionary access 
to the information.  Although this Act does not require additional disclosure of events not 
covered by Form 8-K such disclosure is encouraged. 
 
Following Regulation FD, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was signed into law on August 1, 2002. This 
Act has both extended the mandated reporting obligations of the Form 8-K, r educed filing 
deadlines from the then current 5-days to 2-days after the triggering event as well as embracing 
the concept of continuous mandated disclosure in its Section 409.  This section creates an 
obligation for companies to deliver timely reports to investors and other stakeholders on any 
                                                  
2 Commentary:  Competing Watchdogs Are Good for the Street Business Week September 1, 2003 ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2004-03 
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“material events” that can affect the finances and operations of a business.  The net effect of the 
recent events in the US has been to again increase the expected level of mandated reporting in 
the economy. 
 
The Regulatory Timeline for US 
 
Implementing the principle of supervision takes time. The time frames over history provide a 
unique period of time separated by approximately 70 years that permits predicted shifts in the 
disclosure threshold to be tested for.  To summarize we provide event times in Table 1: 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
 
Section II: Literature on Impact of Mandated Disclosure on Stock Prices 
A number of researchers have focused on the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts over the years – see 
for example Benston (1973), Friend and Herman (1964), Jarrell (1981), Simon (1989), Stigler 
(1964).  These studies largely conclude that the disclosure requirements of the Act had little or 
no impact upon mean returns, although all detected a significant impact upon the dispersion of 
returns.  To our knowledge there has been no satisfactory explanation of the latter finding.  For 
example, Stigler (1964) and Benston (1973) interpret dispersion as the consequence of “other 
factors” while Friend and Herman (1965) interpret it as the beneficial effect of mandatory 
disclosure by improving investors’ intrinsic value forecasting accuracy.  Jarrell (1981) concluded 
it was evidence of the Act imposing greater costs upon riskier ventures. Simon (1989) concluded 
it could either be due to “left out factors” from an asset pricing model or improvements in the 
quantity and quality of information.   
 
The above conclusions of little to no impact of regulation have received additional support when 
a wider set of regulatory events have been studied.  For example, in a representative paper,) 
Binder examined 20 major changes in regulatory constraints from 1887 to 1985 and from tests of ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2004-03 
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first moments of both monthly and daily data the conclusion was that such tests have 
“surprisingly little ability to detect the effects of regulation” (Binder (1985)). 
 
Other authors (Horwitz and Kolodny (1977), Simonds and Collins (1978)) have examined the 
line of business reporting (LIBUR) first required by the Securities and Exchange Commission in 
1971 using a capital asset pricing model to assess the effectiveness of this disclosure requirement 
on the securities market.  Horwitz and Kolodny report that L IBUR did not affect investors’ 
assessments of the riskiness of multi-segment firms. S imonds and Collins disagree citing 
shortcomings in sample selection and hypothesis testing procedures – their empirical analysis 
indicated that LIBUR disclosure did convey useful information to investors and that the average 
effect was a downward shift in their assessment of a multi segment firm’s market risk. 
 
Regulation FD has been the focus of a number of event studies (Heflin, Subramanayam and 
Zhang. (2001)).   In their paper they study stock return volatility before and after the event date.  
They motivate this study in response to alarms raised by the analyst sector that Regulation FD 
would increase volatility.  They conclude that Regulation FD did not increase return volatility on 
either a daily or per incidence of extreme days’ bases.  Bailey, Li, Mao and Zhong (2003) also 
find that after Regulation FD market behavior around earnings releases displays no significant 
change in return volatility (after controlling for decimalization of stock trading) but analyst 
forecast dispersion increases. Consistent with this finding,  Irani and Karamanou (2002) 
document a decrease in analyst following and an increase in forecast dispersion following the 
passage of Regulation FD.  Zitzewitz (2002) reports evidence that Regulation FD had its desired 
effect of reducing selective disclosure of information about future earnings to individual analysts 
without reducing the total amount of information disclosed.  
 
Botosan (1997) has examined the question of voluntary disclosure levels and its impact upon 
cost of capital.  Although this paper did not examine the impact of regulation, it did use a 
disclosure measure that was limited to the information provided in the annual reports.  Botosan ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2004-03 
Copyright 2004 © Beardsley and O’Brien    9 
documented an association with the measure of sensitivity to market risk (beta) where she 
suggests a relationship between disclosure and systematic risk. 
 
In this paper the approach we adopt is to start from the premise that these major Securities Acts 
and regulatory initiatives are likely to have a real impact upon investor expectations.  Although, 
we cannot observe expectations directly we can infer shifts in expectations by observing the 
behavior of the voluntary disclosure threshold.  Reasons supporting these predictions come from 
the analytical disclosure literature which we review and develop in the next section. 
 
 
Section III: Theory and Predictions 
In the voluntary disclosure literature if there are no costs associated with the truthful disclosure 
of information, and investors can form rational expectations; a fully separating equilibrium 
results (Grossman and Hart (1980), Grossman (December 1981)).  Full separation is inconsistent, 
however, with the fact that in the 1930s, prior to the 1933 Act,  some firms disclosed voluntarily 
and others chose not to.  It is also inconsistent with the emphasis placed upon drafting strong 
disclosure regulation in the 1930’s and again the current extensions of this regulation As a result, 
regulatory trends support the premise that there are non trivial explicit and opportunity costs 
associated with disclosure.   
More recently, Regulation FD created an obligation for prompt disclosure of material 
information to the general public (e.g., 8-K reports).  Regulation FD explicitly prohibits selective 
disclosure to subgroups such as analysts, a requirement that would be unnecessary if full 
separation existed.  From a disclosure cost perspective, Regulation FD also creates an obligation 
for boards to manage disclosure policy on an ongoing basis.  This was reinforced by the 
significant overhaul of Corporate Governance requirements in the Sarbanes-Oxley regulation 
including Section 409 which pertains to ongoing disclosure. 
 
Regulation FD was predicted to have a significant impact upon the disclosure of information.  
Most commentators predicted an increase in available information apart from the recipients of ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2004-03 
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selective disclosures who predicted the opposite.  However early empirical studies of Regulation 
FD’s impact failed to detect significant evidence that lent unambiguous in support to either side 
(Bailey, Li, Mao and Zhong (2003), Zitzewitz (2002)).  This leads to questions regarding the 
lack of enforcement of Regulation FD suggesting that more definitive results may be possible 
once more data has been accumulated post October 2000. 
For example, subsequent to passing Regulation FD the new Republican appointed head of the SEC, 
Harvey Pitt, was reportedly critical of Regulation FD resulting in questions regarding its intent.  
Such concerns became a major political issue with the likes of Al Gore, Tom Daschle and John 
McCain openly calling for Pitt’s resignation.  Ultimately a consensus formed between Washington 
and Wall Street that a more aggressive chairman was needed to head the SEC to enforce regulatory 
changes.  Evidence of how widespread such speculation had become is reflected in the following 
headline in the popular press (December 10, 2002): 
“Bush picks polar opposite of Pitt to head SEC” (USA Today 12/10/2002). 
The replacement of Pitt by Donaldson to head the SEC and the enactment of the Sarbanes -Oxley 
Act signaled that significant regulatory change had become a permanent part of the new financial 
environment.  In terms of affecting mandated disclosure requirements these events lead to the 
over-the-counter market, NASDAQ, implementing significant changes to its listing 
requirements, a significant signal of intent to enforce the disclosure components of the new 
regulation3.  Examples, in relation to creating obligations for the ongoing Disclosure of Material 
Information under NASDAQ listing rules, are SR-NASD-2002-85 filed August 7, 2002 and 
approved by the SEC December 9, 2002.  As summarized by NASDAQ (December 9, 2002): 
“NASDAQ is the first major stock market to modernize its disclosure rules, making it easier for 
NASDAQ-listed companies to comply with both NASDAQ disclosure rules and Regulation FD.  
Now, in addition to issuing press releases, companies can utilize current technology, including 
webcasts, conference calls and 8-K filings.  The new rules will minimize confusion between Reg FD-
                                                  
3 NASDAQ was the earliest mover to embrace mandated disclosure changes implied from Regulation FD into its 
listing requirements.  Arguably, it had the greatest incentive because on June 7, 2001 it filed to the SEC for National 
Securities Exchange status under Section 6 of the Securities Exchange Act 1934.   ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2004-03 
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compliant and NASDAQ-compliant disclosure mediums and address concerns that self-regulatory 
organization (SRO) rules have the effect of overriding the disclosure flexibility provided by Reg FD”  
(NASDAQ Bulletin titled:  “SEC Approves New NASDAQ Disclosure Rules” December 9, 
2002). 
As a result, it is clear that exchange responses to Regulation FD disclosure obligations have 
taken time.  It is questionable, however, what the predicted impact will be for the NYSE.  This is 
because the NYSE has focused upon integrating the Corporate Governance changes introduced 
by Sarbanes-Oxley into their listing obligations while NASDAQ has focused upon both 
disclosure and corporate governance implications.  This point was emphasized by NASDAQ’s 
senior vice president in charge of listing (Emen (2003)): 
“NASDAQ's proposals incorporate steps to increase transparency and disclosure…. we propose to 
require all issuers to adopt codes of conduct conforming to the requirements of SOX for all employees 
and directors, and to disclose any waivers granted to executive officers and directors. More generally, 
NASDAQ is the only U.S. market to have fully endorsed the spirit behind the adoption of SEC 
Regulation FD by recognizing that any Regulation FD compliant public disclosure by an issuer will 
satisfy its NASDAQ disclosure obligations. New rules will only be effective if they are vigorously 
enforced and the best deterrent against future misconduct is the realization that non-compliance will 
come at a high cost. NASDAQ devotes nearly 60 full-time staff to enforcing its listing standards. While 
some have suggested that there should be alternative sanctions to delisting proceedings, N ASDAQ 
believes the threat of delisting is the only tool powerful enough to assure future compliance.”  
For the case of the American Stock Exchange (AMEX), however, we predict that it is likely to 
have the same impact upon investor expectations as NASDAQ given the fact that a merger 
between NASDAQ and AMEX was implemented on November 2, 1998 (Sapp and Yan (2003)). 
 
We note also that Regulation FD represents a major advancement over the 1933/1934 regulations 
by exploiting modern technology for modernizing the rules for disclosure. Technology permits 
increased levels of ongoing disclosure to be implemented.  This is important for implementing 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act which places communication policy on the center stage of a company’s ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2004-03 
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corporate governance practice by extending the obligations for and increasing the potential costs 
associated with the disclosure requirements in Regulation FD.  Sarbanes-Oxley also opens the 
possibility for stronger “continuous” disclosure obligations in the future, with its Section 409.    
As a result, the new NASDAQ-compliant disclosure media for modernizing their rules provide 
the basis for a broader implementation of these stronger mandated disclosure requirements by 
including required operational details as part of their listing requirements. 
 
The above regulatory trends fit well the assumptions made in analytical literature on voluntary 
disclosures and especially so for the case of NASDAQ compared to the NYSE given the above 
discussion.  Both impact and/or possible differential impact upon investor expectations thus 
become an interesting and largely unexplored issue.  In this paper, we will draw upon predicted 
behavior from the voluntary disclosure literature for the disclosure threshold in our attempt to 
take steps towards filling this void. 
 
In one strand of  the literature a unique disclosure threshold results at the point where the 
marginal benefit from not disclosing equals the marginal exogenous cost from disclosing 
(Verrecchia (1983), Verrecchia (1990)).  A second strand of the literature considers endogenous 
disclosure costs arising from the conflict of self interests from the decision to disclose versus 
withhold when investors are not sure whether the manager is in possession of the information.  In 
this strand of the  voluntary disclosure literature a unique threshold again results because the 
unraveling into a separating equilibrium stops when the marginal benefits from mimicking 
equals the marginal cost to existing shareholders from disclosing the information in a rational 
expectations equilibrium (Dye (1985), Dye (1986), Jung and Kwon (1988)).   
 
Both of these strands capture essential features of the recent regulatory trends which influence 
the marginal cost and marginal benefits associated with the decision to disclose versus not to 
disclose.  First, the regulation has created a legal obligation for the truthful and non selective 
disclosure of information material to prices.  This influences directly the marginal cost associated 
with truthful disclosure.  The major cost here is the cost associated with the communication ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2004-03 
Copyright 2004 © Beardsley and O’Brien    13 
policy that includes the board and has been estimated as high as $7 billion in year one
4, because 
an obligation for timely and non selective disclosure now exists.  Second, the general thrust of 
mandated disclosure regulation has the effect of  reducing the probability of insiders being 
privately informed with price sensitive information as well a s  increasing the precision of 
investor priors regarding assessed future value distributions given the finer information that is 
available.   
 
In this paper we work at the general market level.  Although the analytical voluntary disclosure 
literature focuses upon a single firm, and therefore, arguably diversifiable sources of risk, it 
provides testable systematic risk implications when combined with the i nsights from the 
estimation risk literature.  This is because reducing estimation risk, has systematic risk 
implications when investors assess the distribution of future payoffs from a firm ((for a review of 
this literature see Clarkson, Guedes and Thompson (1996)).  As a result, mandating disclosure 
has the effect of reducing estimation risk by increasing the precision of investor priors, which in 
turn has the implied impact upon the voluntary disclosure threshold identified in the literature.  
In addition, the above literature assumes that the information being disclosed in aggregate has no 
production implications (and thus no aggregate impact upon the future value distribution in terms 
of the first moment (see Pae (1999)).  For our current purposes this is a useful feature because 
the statutory objectives for the regulation reviewed do not rest upon production related 
assumptions.  It does, however, rest upon assumptions about restoring investor confidence, 
market stability, eliminating informational asymmetries and therefore reducing systematic risk. 
 
We now first develop a set of testable hypotheses and then the methodology for testing them 




                                                  
4  The internal control rules are by far the most contentious and potentially onerous provisions. Industry experts say 
that as a result of these rules, auditing costs are likely to double, while the total tab for compliance could top $7 
billion in the first year.”  Business Week “Honesty is a Pricey Policy” October 27, 2003 ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2004-03 
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First, if the regulation is meeting statutory objectives then the voluntary disclosure threshold 
should shift to the right. In the presence of stronger obligations for truthful disclosure support for 
this hypothesis follows because, although investors still form assessments about the manager 
possessing private information, the overall likelihood of managers being in possession of private 
information is reduced.  As a result, the hypothesis follows from Proposition 2 of Jung and Kwon 
(1988).  Alternatively, with greater amounts of mandated information available to investors then 
the precision of investor priors about the future value distribution increase which results in a 
right shift of the disclosure threshold (Verrecchia (1990)). 
 
Second, we predict that Regulation FD has a larger and delayed effect upon stocks traded on 
NASDAQ and AMEX versus stocks traded on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE).  The 
major reason is the alignment of both the disclosure and corporate governance requirements with 
the NASDAQ listing requirements versus only the alignment of the Corporate Governance 
requirements associated with the listing requirements of the NYSE.  For the case of AMEX, 
given its merged status with NASDAQ the same prediction as for NASDAQ should carry over to 
the AMEX. 
 
Third, we predict the right shift in the disclosure threshold will be stronger for NASDAQ traded 
securities versus securities listed on other exchanges. 
 
In the next section, we discuss how the empirical tests of the above testable hypotheses have 
been constructed. 
 
Section IV: Methodology 
The method we employ is designed to test analytical results that relate shifts in the voluntary 
disclosure threshold, to definitions of first and second degree stochastic dominance (e.g., Jung 
and Kwon (1988) Proposition 3 and similarly Verrecchia’s Corollary 2 (1990)).   In the 
Verrecchia economy, the comparative static results have recently been extended to generalized 
distributional forms by Jorgensen and Orbay (2003).  Secondly, it should permit implications to ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2004-03 
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be drawn from shifts in the threshold for systematic risk.  To make the linkages precise we first 
exploit the set of equivalence relationships derived by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970).  In 
addition, because analytical characterizations are derived in terms of real world probabilities 
second we provide the link between the testable implications of the theory and risk neutralized 
probability distrib ution. 
 
Equivalence Relationships Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) 
 
First, we observe that distributions with the same first moment can be ranked using the mean 
preserving increase in spread definition of risk Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970).  Formally, if 
distributions F and G are defined over the interval [a,b] and y is any element within the interval, 
then F is less risky than distribution G if and only if: 
i.  
[ ] ￿ = -
b
a
dx x F x G 0 ) ( ) (
 
ii.  
[ ] ￿ ‡ -
y
a
dx x F x G 0 ) ( ) (
 
 
Second, this definition can equivalently be formulated in terms of outcomes.  That is, consider a 
random variable y constructed from another random variable x by adding unbiased noise (i.e., an 
additional source of volatility to x).  Under this construction an equivalent relationship to mean 
preserving spreads can be characterized in terms of mean preserving outcomes.  Under this 
interpretation and when  x and  y are portfolio realizations pre and post some event, then 
dominance, defined in the usual Markowitz sense of the term, is captured5.  Finally, these two 
definitions are also equivalent to the usual utility based definitions of risk aversion.  As a result, 
operationally we can directly test and interpret the implications from a shift in the disclosure 
threshold by measuring shifts in mean preserving distributions. 
 
                                                  
5  This is the same condition exploited by Jorgensen and Orbay (2003) to characterize a sufficient condition 
between monotone comparative statics and second order stochastic shifts in the generalized Verrecchia economy.   ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2004-03 
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The above equivalence relations are provided relative to real world probability distributions.  To 
complete the derivation of the methodology  introduced here, we will demonstrate that the 
information for inferring a shift in the voluntary disclosure threshold is preserved by measuring 
shifts in the risk neutral probability distributions.  To establish this last fact we observe that the 
risk neutral distributions permit, without loss of generality, the mean preserving condition to be 
invoked because first moment information drops out.  We then implement a marginal utility 
approach to constructing the risk neutral probabilities in a manner that retains the information 
required to exploit the Jung and Kwon linkage between shifts in the voluntary disclosure 
threshold and stochastic dominance.  We develop this approach next. 
 
Estimating the Risk Neutralized Distribution 
 
Luenberger (1997) discusses the theoretical basis for estimating the implied risk neutral return 
distribution from a single path of realized returns.  Winston (1999) has applied this methodology 
using Monte Carlo simulation. This technique has the advantage of not placing structure upon 
the assumed distribution but instead places the structure upon preferences.  In particular, the 
preference assumption is logarithmic. There is support in the financial literature for using the 
logarithmic utility function U(w) = Ln(w) ( Brown (1987), Kelly (1956), Latane (1959), 
Luenberger (1998)) as a way of capturing some important basic properties of observed investor 
behavior.  The logarithmic utility function is consistent with maximizing expected long-term 
growth rate of wealth when using a single period optimization strategy and is consistent with the 
utility function implied from aggregate market behavior (Brown (1987)).   
 
In this paper, we are only concerned with detecting shifts in the voluntary disclosure threshold 
not interpreting behavior in any absolute manner.  So as long as the logarithmic utility function is 
correlated with the marginal risk preferences of the market it will serve this purpose.  The 
literature  reviewed above lend support to the premise that the logarithmic utility function 
captures important information about the marginal risk preferences of the market. We consider 
how it may be used to risk neutralize the distribution next. ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2004-03 
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For the case of the log utility preference  U(w), we may uniquely risk neutralize empirical 
probabilities by assuming that the set of daily price changes over some period of time is arbitrage 
free and the frequency distribution represent the empirical probabilities.  We then  uniquely “risk 
neutralize” the empirical probabilities by using the logarithmic utility approach.  That is, we 
begin with some initial wealth invested in the stock index and assume that the marginal investor 
chooses an amount a to invest in the index and (1 - a) in the risk-free asset to maximize their 
expected log utility of ending wealth relative to the empirical probabilities (i.e., along the 
realized path for the specified period of time).  Associated with this optimal choice a* let Wk
* = 
a*(1 + rk) + (1- a*)(1 + r) be terminal wealth for outcome k and therefore the marginal utility and 
empirical probabilities imply the risk neutralized probabilities as follows. 
 


















where pk are the real world probabilities associated with the path of price changes. 
 
We analyze the sample of realized returns before and after a major economic event.  We then 
bootstrap the expected risk neutral returns of these indices by assuming that each daily return for one 
year has the same chance of being the index’s r eturn for any given day along the path (Winston 
(1999)).  Under the assumption that the realized path of price changes is arbitrage free, we ran 
100,000 iterations of a Monte Carlo program to generate expected risk neutral distributions of the 
terminal values pre and post a significant market event over the time periods associated with each 
legislative event.    
 
To test the assumption of arbitrage free price changes we examine an implication from the weak form 
of the efficient market’s hypothesis.  That is, if price changes follow geometric Brownian motion then ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2004-03 
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the terminal distribution at the end of any period of time is lognormal.  As a result, we test the null 
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where S is the spot price at beginning of the year, and E(St) and Var(St) were estimated from the 
simulation.   Combined, the above demonstrates that the important information is preserved in 
the higher order moments of the risk neutralized distribution. 
 
In summary, our methodology is designed to detect shifts in the disclosure threshold, induced by 
revisions in investor expectations, by examining the behavior in terms of stochastic dominance 
of the risk neutralized terminal distribution of the index value implied from the path of realized 
price changes before and after some event. 
 
We note, however, that statistically our technique depends upon the realized path of price 
changes being arbitrage free.  This is the condition that implies t he existence of the risk 
neutralized probabilities.  After that we are dealing with population estimates and therefore any 
shift is statistically significant. 
 
 
Section V: Results 
As discussed above, our main interest is to infer shifts in the threshold by examining the whether 
the risk neutral return distribution satisfies the property of second order stochastic dominance 
when estimated before and after an important economic event.  If this condition is satisfied we 
can draw inferences about the direction of the shift in the disclosure threshold.  
 
In particular, if distribution F stochastically dominates distribution G in the second order then we 
infer that the disclosure threshold associated with G is to the left of the threshold associated with ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2004-03 
Copyright 2004 © Beardsley and O’Brien    19 
F.  We analyze this by observing whether or not the single crossing point property is satisfied 
and in what the implied direction of the shift is. 
 
Test of the assumption that prices are arbitrage free 
 
To be able interpret the results from the stochastic dominance analysis we first test that price 
changes over the time periods examined are arbitrage free by testing the hypothesis that the 
implied risk neutral return distribution is lognormal which is consistent with price changes 
satisfying weak form market efficiency. 
 
Results from 1933/34: The Securities Act 1933 and the Security Exchange Act 1934 
 
For the DJIA over the time periods in the 1930’s examined, we found that, in all cases, the null 
hypothesis of consistency with the lognormal distribution could not be rejected. The Tables 
provided in Appendix A provide the supporting analysis and Appendices C and D provide the 
supporting analysis for the recent data.  By equating the means for the before and after risk 
neutralized terminal value distribution to the average of the first moments over the combined 
period, we test for stochastic dominance from the implied single crossing condition. 
 
A.  Graphs of Stochastic Dominance Effects 
 
In the following results section we provide the dominance relationship below each g raph.  
Because we are dealing with population estimates, any shift is significant.  However, 
interpretation depends largely upon the realized path of price changes being arbitrage free over 
the time periods examined.   
 
We consider three time periods:  one year prior to July 27, 1933;  July 27, 1933 to August 31, 
1934; and one year after August 31, 1934 corresponding to T -1, T, T+1 as labeled. For 
comparison purposes each graph is provided with its domain scaled to equal the mean plus/minus ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2004-03 
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two times the average volatility.  Volatility of the interim period between July 27, 1933 and 
August 31, 1934, has been standardized with respect to time by invoking the assumption of 
linear in the square root of time.  As a result, the pre-, in-between and post periods of time are 
comparable for the stochastic dominance analysis.  
 
The supporting table of numbers is provided in Appendix B.  Below the graph we indicate the 
dominance relationship as > implying the shift is to the right for the threshold (and therefore to 
the right in the region below the single crossing point and to the left above the single crossing 
point).  The Chi-Square statistic tests the hypothesis of no shift in the distribution from T versus 
T-1 and then T+1 versus T respectively. 
 
For the case of the 1933 Securities Act, we detect a monotonic shift as we move from pre 1933 
through to post 1934 as depicted in Figure 1.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
Here post 1934 dominates significantly the interim period which in turn dominates pre 1933.  
This implies that the shift in the threshold point was to the right over the interval of time from 
pre 1933, to the interim to post 1934.  This is consistent with the hypothesized effect of 
mandated disclosure.    
 
Recall that the empirical analyses of the mandated disclosure Act of 1933 have all reported a 
shift in the dispersion.  We demonstrate the relationship between the fitted distribution and 
dispersion in Table 1 (Appendix 1).  From this table both the fitted distribution and the actual 
distribution of the dispersion results exhibit the same d eclining trend.  As result, this table 
supports the interpretation that this systematic empirical finding is an implication a shift in the 
voluntary disclosure threshold to the right.  That is, the above evidence is consistent with the 
prior studies of the SEC 1933/1934 Acts but the difference is that the dispersion results are now 
the predicted consequence of the regulation. ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2004-03 
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The economic interpretation of the 1933/1934 analysis, in conjunction with results from prior 
empirical  studies reported in the literature, is that mandated disclosure does not enhance the 
informational efficiency of the economy, but rather shifted the economy from  one voluntary 
disclosure rational expectations equilibrium to another in a manner that is consistent with 
regulatory objectives.  Furthermore, these results are highly significant. We show in the chart 
below the change in risk neutralized volatility flowing from the legislation. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
 
We note that our conclusions are substantially different from the conclusions drawn from the 
older empirical studies in this area.  Furthermore, the fact that the structure put in place by the 
1933/34 regulation has survived in tact over the last 70 odd years suggests, contrary to 
conclusions drawn from earlier empirical studies, that the regulators at that time achieved 
significant success relative to their objectives!  Our above findings are consistent with this 
conclusion.  Our results are also consistent with reported volatility results in the older empirical 
literature.  The main difference, however, between our current paper and these earlier works is 
that we exploit theory (not available to the majority of the older empirical papers) to identify 
refinements of set of hypotheses that can be tested.  That is, by testing directly for the impact 
upon investors’ rational expectations, by measuring for shifts in the disclosure threshold. 
 
Results from 2000/2002: US Regulation FD and Sarbanes-Oxley 
 
To examine the impact we break the estimation periods down into approximate one year periods 
designed to account for various intervening factors.  In particular, we control for two major 
events - decimalization and the September 11 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center.  Our 
event estimation periods are as follows: 
i.  1-Year Pre-Regulation FD (October 23, 2000), denoted as T-1. ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2004-03 
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ii.  221-days after October 23, 2000 denoted as T.  This is post Regulation FD but prior 
to September 11, 2001.  It includes the shift to decimalization by the Exchanges and 
NASDAQ. 
iii.  221-days after September 11, 2001 which is pre-Sarbanes-Oxley, denoted as T+1
6. 
iv.  1-year post Sarbanes-Oxley denoted as T+2. 
 
In the above classification, we note that decimalization could affect our hypotheses to the extent 
that it impacts the higher moments of the risk neutralized distribution.  Previous papers have 
reported a reduction in the variance of returns post decimalization which would work in favor of 
supporting our major hypotheses.  On the other hand, September 11, 2001 is likely to work 
against the major hypotheses by increasing variance.  Further, it is likely that September 11 
effects have a much stronger impact than decimalization and therefore overall this is likely to 
bias our results against detecting any effects.  To control for such events we analyze both the 
pooled period covering ii. and iii. above as well as the separated sub-periods.  We report the 
more detailed analysis because pooling does not alter any of our general conclusions. We 
provide the supporting table of numbers in Appendix E 
 
In reporting these results, we provide the stochastic dominance test with the dominance 
relationship provided below each graph.  For comparison purposes each graph has its domain 
scaled to equal the mean plus/minus two times the average volatility.  Volatility has been 
standardized with respect to time by invoking the assumption of linear in the square root of time 
as specified in the theory section of this paper.  As a result, the pre-, in-between and post periods 
of time are comparable for the stochastic dominance analysis.   
 
In addition, we show the results of a Chi-Square Statistic which provides a numerical measure of 
the degree to which the distribution has shifted.  Finally, the first moment of the risk neutralized 
return distribution is normalized to a risk free rate equal to 5% annualized. 
                                                  
6 By breaking up the data in this manner the sample falls cleanly either side of September 11 and the shift to 
decimal quotations falls within the first 221-day period.  ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2004-03 
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Below each graph we indicate the dominance relationship as > implying the direction of the 
voluntary disclosure shift.  In particular, “T-1 < T” implies a shift of the voluntary disclosure 
threshold to the right after an event occurring at time T.   
 
The relative size of the separation can be gauged by the size of the Chi-Square statistic.  The 
three Chi–Square statistics correspond to 221-days post Regulation FD versus Pre-Regulation 
FD, Post 9/11 versus Pre 9/11
7, and Post Sarbanes-Oxley versus Pre Sarbanes-Oxley. We first 
present our results by major market indexes given the differences predicted between the 
NASDAQ and the NYSE for hypothesis 2.  Thus the results for the NYSE index, two NASDAQ 
indexes (technology heavy 100 as well as the general NASDAQ index), and finally the AMEX 
index known as XAX.  
 
INSERT FIGURES 3 – 6 HERE 
 
The above results provide a striking contrast.  The NASDAQ and AMEX results provide strong 
support for the impact of the recent regulation shifting the voluntary disclosure threshold to the 
right as predicted.  The strongest has been NASDAQ which is consistent with the fact that this 
market has been the most aggressive in terms of their response to enforcing Regulation FD.  The 
NYSE results support the inference that the disclosure threshold shifted to the left.  That is, 
NYSE results are not consistent with the hypothesis but as noted earlier or is it consistent with 
NASDAQ/AMEX results.  The NYSE has been aggressive on the Corporate Governance front 
but not on the disclosure aspects in the new regulation.  This suggests that an individual market’s 
responses in terms of strong statements in support of the regulation combined with changes to 
listing requirements that are designed to facilitate the implementation of the new regulation has a 
positive impact upon investor expectations.   
 
                                                  
7 We computed risk neutralized both with and without the actual September 11 day.  No real difference was 
observed and therefore in the following results the day of September 11 has been excluded. ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2004-03 
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We examine a number of other indexes viz. the DJIA, S&P100, S&P500, Russell 1000, and 
Russell 2000 indexes.  The results for these indexes are shown in Appendix F.  There is a 
monotonic trend when moving from large liquid stocks to smaller less liquid stocks (negative to 
a relative more positive impact).  However, the given that each of these i ndexes exhibit a 
systematically lower proportion of non NYSE stocks (moving from DJIA to Russell 2000) we 
conclude that this is primarily due to the market differences whereas the impact upon small 
versus large stocks is of second order significance. 
 
Regulation FD and Sarbanes-Oxley Implications 
 
The above findings for Regulation FD combined with Sarbanes-Oxley suggest that the broad 
indexes reflect two opposing trends.  The NYSE exchange aggressively embraced the corporate 
governance requirements but not the disclosure requirements, which coincided with a left shift of 
the disclosure threshold.  For the case of NASDAQ, on the other hand, which aggressively 
embraced both the corporate governance and the disclosure obligations as part of their listing 
requirements, coincided with a right shift in the threshold as predicted by the theory.   
 
We now summarize the effect on volatilities for our pooled period in the charts below. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 7 HERE 
 
The chart above shows annualized risk neutral volatilities relating to major indices by 
exchange/market plus for comparison with the previous graph the Dow Jones Industrial Average 
(which is predominantly NYSE but includes two stocks listed on NASDAQ).  Volatilities are 
split into three time periods (and standardized for the size of the time period differences): 
 
•  One year pre Regulation FD (252 working days before October 23, 2000). 
•  21 months between Regulation FD and Sarbanes-Oxley (442 working days b etween 
October 23, 2000 and August 1, 2002). ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2004-03 
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•  One year post Sarbanes-Oxley (252 working days after August 1, 2002). This p eriod 
includes the “harmonization” of NASDAQ’s disclosure requirements with the Securities 
and Exchange Commission’s Regulation FD on November 25, 2002. 
 
The results from 70 years earlier are also strongly consistent with the NASDAQ/AMEX results 
today.  In both cases  there were strong new disclosure laws including policies in conjunction 
with the mode of disclosure.  For 1933/34 this was the specific set of SEC reports that are still in 
place today and for the case of the recent regulation this was an expanded form of acceptable 
reporting designed with today’s technology in mind.  In both cases the estimated impact upon the 
voluntary disclosure threshold has been consistent with predictions from the voluntary disclosure 
literature but in a manner that suggests that it is important to address both the nature of the 
disclosure  requirements as well as implementation issues arising from the new regulation’s 
disclosure r equirements.  For example, NASDAQ (which has merged status with AMEX) 
summarized their new rules that largely coincided with the passing of the Sarbanes-Oxley as 
follows8: 
 
“NASDAQ is the first major stock market to modernize its disclosure rules, making it easier for 
NASDAQ-listed companies to comply with both NASDAQ disclosure rules and Reg FD. Now, in 
addition t o issuing press releases, companies can utilize current technology, including webcasts, 
conference calls and 8 -K filings. The new rules will minimize confusion between Reg FD-
compliant and NASDAQ-compliant disclosure mediums and address concerns that self-regulatory 
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Section VI: Conclusions 
In this paper, we tested hypotheses designed to identify the impact of regulation upon investor 
confidence and market stability under the assumption that financial market prices are arbitrage 
free.  Overall, there is a remarkable degree of consistency in the results from two important 
periods of time in history.  In both periods the impact of the regulation was positive in relation to 
statutory objectives with the exception of the NYSE stock index.  For the case of NYSE, which 
is in stark contrast to NASDAQ and AMEX, this could imply that the recent legislation has had a 
positive impact upon smaller stocks but a negative impact upon larger stocks.  This is consistent 
with the analyst industry functioning appropriately for large stocks, but the more far reaching 
implications of Sarbanes-Oxley inadvertently creating incentives for less overall disclosure for 
large stocks.   That is, by institutionalizing communication policies at the corporate governance 
level may result in less (but more sterilized) disclosure.  For example,  
 
“Execs are grumbling about the steep costs of complying with new financial controls. Welcome to 
the brave new world of Section 404 of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which requires executives 
and auditors to evaluate companies' internal financial controls. On Oct. 7, the accounting 
profession's new overseer, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), proposed 
standards to guide auditors and companies in how to do that. The aim is to prevent the kind of 
financial shenanigans that caused meltdowns at WorldCom, Enron, and a host of other former 
highfliers. 
Although these requirements are not the only ones at issue they are commonly perceived to be the 
most costly: But the internal control rules are by far the most contentious and potentially onerous 
provisions. Industry experts say that as a result of these rules, auditing costs are likely to double, 
while the total tab for compliance could top $7 billion in the first year.”
9 
 
Our results provide some support for this type of current criticism in relation to large, but not 
small, stocks.  However, the evidence is more consistent with the observed effects of regulation 
being driven by differences among the exchanges/market response to the regulation as opposed 
to firm size per se.  This was because the favorable impact of the regulation upon smaller firms 
                                                  
9 Business Week “Honesty is a Pricey Policy October 27, 2003  ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2004-03 
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was much less pronounced than the observed impact when cutting the data by exchange/market 
response.  This position is further reinforced by the documented different subsequent behavior 
observed from NASDAQ versus the NYSE with respect to embracing issues related to 
disclosure, as opposed to corporate governance, relative to the new regulation.   NASDAQ’s 
strong actions in support of the disclosure intentions of Regulation FD had a significant 
favorable impact upon investors’ expectations. 
 
Finally, the evidence also supports the conclusion that the behavior of investors’ expectations 
today is  consistent with the behavior of investors’ expectations in the 1930’s.  Our strong 
positive findings from the 1933/34 Acts are not consistent with conclusions drawn from earlier 
studies in the literature even though they are consistent with volatility evidence reported from 
these earlier studies.  Two reasons for these differences discussed in this current paper are that 
we measure for the effects of predicted shifts in rational expectations equilibrium as opposed to 
asking the question whether the market became in some sense more efficient.  Secondly, we are 
testing hypotheses that have become possible in the light of later developments in the analytical 
voluntary disclosure literature.  This permits the volatility related evidence to be reassessed in a 
different manner and supports our conclusion that the original regulators produced a very 
acceptable set of laws that stood the test of time for some 70 years. ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2004-03 
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Table 1:  Event Dates: The 1933 and 1934 legislation dates are when Congress passed the Acts. 
The SEC adopted Regulation FD in a 3-1 vote on August 10, 2000. Regulation FD took effect on 
October 23, 2000.  Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on July 25, 2002. President Bush 
signed the Act into law on July 30, 2002. 
 
Legislation  Date 
Securities Act  July 27, 1933 
Securities Exchange Act  August 31, 1934 
Regulation Fair Disclosure (Regulation FD)  October 23, 2000 
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Figure 1: Cumulative Risk Neutralized Return Distribution for the Dow Jones Industrial 
Index one year pre The Securities Act 1933; Interim between 1933/1934 Acts; and one year 
post the Securities Exchange Act 1934. This graph depicts the estimated shifts in the 
disclosure threshold by examining the stochastic dominance behavior of the cumulative risk 
neutralized terminal distributions estimated 1-year prior to the passing of the 1933 Securities 
Act (T-1), the interim time between the 1933 and 1934 Acts (T), and 1-year after the 1934 
Act (T+1).  The observed dominance relationships are:  T-1 < T < T+1 where “<” denotes 
stochastic dominance of the second degree.  That is, below the single crossing point the 
graphs from left to right are T -1, T, and T+1.  The Chi-Square statistics, testing the null 
hypothesis for no shift in the distribution (from T-1 to T; and T to T+1) are 49780.91 (T to T-
1), and 20270.91 (T+1 to T). 
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Figure 2: From the estimated risk neutralized terminal payoff distribution, we show the volatility 
of returns by the critical 1930’s event dates for the Dow Jones Industrial Index.  Volatility is 
estimated from:   ] 1 ) [exp( )] ( [ ) (
2 2 - = T S E S Var T T s   
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Figure 3: Cumulative Risk Neutralized Return Distribution for the New York Stock Exchange 
Index (NYA) One year pre Regulation FD; Two 221-day Interim periods between Regulation FD 
and Sarbanes-Oxley; and one year post the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. This graph depicts the estimated 
shifts in the disclosure threshold by examining the stochastic dominance behavior of the 
cumulative risk neutralized terminal distributions estimated 1-year prior to Regulation FD (T-1), 
221 days after Regulation FD (which includes the shift to decimalization but is just prior to 
September 11), (T), 221 days immediately after September 11 up to Sarbanes-Oxley (T+1), and 
1-year after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (T+2).  The observed dominance relationships are:  T-1 > T 
> T+1 = T+2 where “<” denotes stochastic dominance of the second degree.  That is, below the 
single crossing point the graphs from left to right are T+2, T -1, T, T -1.  The Chi-Square 
statistics, testing the null hypothesis for no shift in the distribution (from T-1 to T; T to T+1, T+1 
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Figure 4: Cumulative Risk Neutralized Return Distribution for the NASDAQ Stock Market 
Index One year pre Regulation FD; Two 221-day Interim periods between Regulation FD and 
Sarbanes-Oxley; and one year post the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. This graph depicts the estimated 
shifts in the disclosure threshold by examining the stochastic dominance behavior of the 
cumulative risk neutralized terminal distributions estimated 1-year prior to Regulation FD (T-1), 
221 days after Regulation FD (which includes the shift to decimalization but is just prior to 
September 11), (T), 221 days immediately after September 11 up to Sarbanes-Oxley (T+1), and 
1-year after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (T+2).  The observed dominance relationships are:  T-1 > T 
< T+1 < T+2 where “<” denotes stochastic dominance of the second degree.  That is, below the 
single crossing point the graphs from left to right are T, T -1, T+1, T+2.  The Chi-Square 
statistics, testing the null hypothesis for no shift in the distribution (from T-1 to T; T to T+1, T+1 
to T+2) are 17208.13855 (T vrs T-1), 20720.17384 (T+1 vrs T), 5199.126 (T+2 vrs T+1). 
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Figure 5: Cumulative Risk Neutralized Return Distribution for the NASDAQ 100 Stock Market 
Index One year pre Regulation FD; Two 221-day Interim periods between Regulation FD and 
Sarbanes-Oxley; and one year post the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. This graph depicts the estimated 
shifts in the disclosure threshold by examining the stochastic dominance behavior of the 
cumulative risk neutralized terminal distributions estimated 1-year prior to Regulation FD (T-1), 
221 days after Regulation FD (which includes the shift to decimalization but is just prior to 
September 11), (T), 221 days immediately after September 11 up to Sarbanes-Oxley (T+1), and 
1-year after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (T+2).  The observed dominance relationships are:  T-1 > T 
< T+1 < T+2 where “<” denotes stochastic dominance of the second degree.  That is, below the 
single crossing point the graphs from left to right are T, T -1, T+1, T+2.  The Chi-Square 
statistics, testing the null hypothesis for no shift in the distribution (from T-1 to T; T to T+1, T+1 
to T+2) are 26275.6247 (T vrs T-1), 18268.19 (T+1 vrs T),  8781.248 (T+2 vrs T+1). 
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Figure 6: Cumulative Risk Neutralized Return Distribution for the American Stock Exchange 
Index (XAX) One year pre Regulation FD; Two 221-day Interim periods between Regulation FD 
and Sarbanes-Oxley; and one year post the Sarbanes-Oxley.  This graph depicts the estimated 
shifts in the disclosure threshold by examining the stochastic dominance behavior of the 
cumulative risk neutralized terminal distributions estimated 1-year prior to Regulation FD (T-1), 
221 days after Regulation FD (which i ncludes the shift to decimalization but is just prior to 
September 11), (T), 221 days immediately after September 11 up to Sarbanes-Oxley (T+1), and 
1-year after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (T+2).  The observed dominance relationships are:  T-1 < T 
< T+1 < T+2 where “<” denotes stochastic dominance of the second degree.  That is, below the 
single crossing point the graphs from left to right are T -1, T, T+1, T+2.  The Chi-Square 
statistics, testing the null hypothesis for no shift in the distribution (from T-1 to T; T to T+1, T+1 
to T+2) are 1568.097 (T vrs T-1), 8032.79 (T+1 vrs T), 180.1181 (T+2 vrs T+1). 
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Figure 7: From the estimated risk neutralized terminal payoff distribution the volatility of 
returns is plotted by the critical event dates surrounding Regulation FD and Sarbanes-Oxley each 
of the major Exchanges/Markets.  For comparison purposes with Figure 2 the Dow Jones 
Industrial Index is added even though this largely consists of NYSE stocks but also includes two 
NASDAQ listed stocks.  Return volatility is estimated from:  ] 1 ) [exp( )] ( [ ) (
2 2 - = T S E S Var T T s  
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Appendix A: Estimated Risk Neutralized Terminal Value Distribution for the Dow Jones 
Industrial Index One year pre The Securities Act 1933 (T-1); Interim between 1933/1934 Acts 
(T); and one year post the Securities Exchange Act 1934 (T+1). The end of period risk 
neutralized distribution in levels, estimated from the observed path of daily price changes under 
the assumption they are arbitrage free.  The null hypothesis tested using the Chi-Square statistic 
is that this distribution is lognormal. 
 
  Lognormal Estimate     
DJIA  Mean  Std Dev  Chi Square  Probability 
T-1  104.6914125  49.8749629  208.1  0.1385 
T  95.77169893  29.76751799  193.1  0.3653 
T+1  124.7880923  19.1240145  160.7  0.9186 
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Appendix B: Return Distribution Estimates and Tests of the Shift in the Risk Neutralized Return 
Distributions From 1-Year Prior to Federal Securities Act, 1933 to the Interim Period between 
the 1933 and 1934 Acts (T-1 to T), and Interim Period to 1-Year After the Securities Exchange 
Act, 1934 (T to T+1).  From the estimated risk neutralized terminal payoff distribution the 
volatility of returns is estimated for the Dow Jones Industrial Index by critical 1930’s event dates 
(T-1 = 1-year prior to the passing of the 1933 Securities Act, T = the interim time between the 
1933 and 1934 Acts and T+1 = 1 -year after the 1934 A ct).  It is e stimated from: 
] 1 ) [exp( )] ( [ ) (
2 2 - = T S E S Var T T s . The Chi-Square statistics are constructed from the test of the 
null hypothesis for no shift in the distribution either side of a critical event date. 
 
  Annualized Volatility of Returns 
DJIA  Volatility of Returns  Chi Square 
T-1  0.452258   
T  0.228581  T-1 to T: 49780.91 
T+1  0.152363  T to T+1: 20270.91 
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Appendix C:  Estimated Risk Neutralized Terminal Value Distribution for the Major 
Exchange/Market Indexes One year pre Regulation FD (T-1); Two 221-day Interim periods 
between Regulation FD and Sarbanes-Oxley (T, T+1); and one year post the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(T+2). The end of period risk neutralized distribution in levels, estimated from the observed path 
of daily price changes under the assumption they are arbitrage free.  The null hypothesis tested 
using the Chi-Square statistic is that this distribution is lognormal. 
 
NYSE-NYA  Mean  Std Dev  Chi-Square 
Statistic 
Probability 
T-1  7402.982  1230.714  123.9  0.8469 
T  6269.482  1033.578  147.7  0.3317 
T+1  4998.489  1010.473  159.2  0.1404 
T+2  5903.197  1292.004  151.2  0.263 
NASDAQ  Mean  Std Dev  Chi-Square 
Statistic 
Probability 
T-1  3737.091  1660.241  121.4  0.8818 
T  1775.731  961.915  119.1  0.9092 
T+1  1330.311  460.423  114.7  0.9489 
T+2  1825.048  550.650  136.9  0.5819 
NASDAQ -100  Mean  Std Dev  Chi-Square 
Statistic 
Probability 
T-1  3624.234  1934.846  162.3009  0.1058 
T  1516.715  1050.976  140.0694  0.5063 
T+1  1029.735  461.070  189.8318  0.0038 
T+2  1312.117  476.299  106.7618  0.9858 
AMEX-XAX   Mean  Std Dev  Chi-Square 
Statistic 
Probability 
T-1  1069.729  177.923  52.1816  0.9689 
T  931.339  131.698  125  0.8294 
T+1  985.844  109.677  126.8  0.7983 
T+2  1018.143  116.076  84.0273  0.1775 
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Appendix D:  Estimated Risk Neutralized Terminal Value Distribution for the Major Stock 
Market Indexes Ordered by Firm Size One year pre Regulation FD (T-1); Two 221-day Interim 
periods between Regulation FD and Sarbanes-Oxley (T, T+1); and one year post the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (T+2). The end of period risk neutralized distribution in levels, estimated from the 
observed path of daily price changes under the assumption they are arbitrage free.  The null 
hypothesis tested using the Chi-Square statistic is that this distribution is lognormal. 
 
  Lognormal Estimate     
DJIA  Mean  Std Dev  ChiSquare  Probability 
T-1  10896.293  2157.264  127.4  0.7869 
T  9812.533  1918.036  141.6  0.4702 
T+1  8440.02  1905.827  123.1  0.859 
T+2  9387.637  2332.357  162.4  0.1044 
S&P100  Mean  Std Dev  ChiSquare  Probability 
T-1  788.690  174.804  125.1  0.8282 
T  543.952  136.626  124  0.8457 
T+1  463.600  110.089  156.5  0.1765 
T+2  512.876  131.896  121.7  0.8777 
S&P500  Mean  Std Dev  ChiSquare  Probability 
T-1  1531.315  319.684  135.3379  0.6187 
T  1098.087  242.858  127.1076  0.7928 
T+1  921.537  205.003  141.1599  0.4804 
T+2  1010.111  252.718  139.8819  0.5108 
Russell 1000  Mean  Std Dev  ChiSquare  Probability 
T-1  808.802  174.414  146.6  0.3565 
T  587.979  133.893  167.9  0.0604 
T+1  536.262  135.128  175.8  0.0249 
T+2  541.5231  136.1706  72.97  0.479 
Russell 2000  Mean  Std Dev  ChiSquare  Probability 
T-1  540.351  143.704  123.4042  0.8542 
T  449.559  111.286  141.1883  0.4797 
T+1  400.938  87.78208  152.5426  0.2392 
T+2  496.702  117.307  132.8898  0.6746 
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Appendix E: Return Distribution Estimates for Exchanges/Markets and Tests of the Shift in the 
Risk Neutralized Return Distributions From 1-Year Prior to Regulation FD, 221-Trading Days 
Post Regulation FD (T-1 to T), 221-Trading Days Post Regulation FD to 221-Days Prior to 
Sarbanes-Oxley (T to T+1), 221-Days Prior to Sarbanes-Oxley to 1-Year Post Sarbanes-Oxley 
(T+1 to T+2).  From the estimated risk neutralized terminal payoff distribution the volatility of 
returns is estimated for the Exchanges/Markets by critical event dates.  Volatilty is estimated 
from:  ] 1 ) [exp( )] ( [ ) (
2 2 - = T S E S Var T T s . The Chi-Square statistics are constructed from the test 
of the null hypothesis for no shift in the distribution either side of a critical event date. 
 
  Annualized Volatility of Returns 
NYSE/ NYA   Volatility of Returns  Chi Square 
T-1  0.1651   
T  0.1745  T-1 to T-1: 647.5809 
T+1  0.2133  T to T+1: 10982.4355 
T+2  0.2181  T+1 to T+2: 97.6916 
NASDAQ Index      
T-1  0.4244   
T  0.5406  T-1 to T: 17208.1386 
T+1  0.3585  T to T+1: 20720.1738 
T+2  0.2976  T+1 to T+2: 5199.1265 
NASDAQ 100     
T-1  0.5008   
T  0.6674  T-1 to T: 26275.6247 
T+1  0.4555  T to T+1: 18268.1856 
T+2  0.3547  T+1 to T+2: 8781.2481 
AMEX XAX     
T-1  0.1652   
T  0.1500  T-1 to T: 1568.0969 
T+1  0.1182  T to T+1: 8032.7901 
T+2  0.1146  T+1 to T+2: 180.1181 
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Appendix F: Return Distribution Estimates Ordered by Firm Size and Tests of the Shift in the 
Risk Neutralized Return Distributions From 1-Year Prior to Regulation FD, 221-Trading Days 
Post Regulation FD (T-1 to T), 221-Trading Days Post Regulation FD to 221-Days Prior to 
Sarbanes-Oxley (T to T+1), 221-Days Prior to Sarbanes-Oxley to 1-Year Post Sarbanes-Oxley 
(T+1 to T+2).  From the estimated risk neutralized terminal payoff distribution the volatility of 
returns is estimated for the Exchanges/Markets by critical event dates.  Volatilty is estimated 
from:   ] 1 ) [exp( )] ( [ ) (
2 2 - = T S E S Var T T s  The Chi-Square statistics are constructed from the test 
of the null hypothesis for no shift in the distribution either side of a critical event date. 
 
  Annualized Volatility of Returns 
DJIA  Volatility of Returns  Chi Square 
T-1  0.1961   
T  0.2064  T versus T-1: 547.6090 
T+1  0.2377  T+1 versus T: 4888.9333 
T+2  0.2467  T+2 versus T+1: 286.2901 
S&P100     
T-1  0.2190   
T  0.2636  T versus T-1: 9125.1145 
T+1  0.2496  T+1 versus T: 528.0506 
T+2  0.2551  T+2 versus T+1: 294.8863 
S&P500     
T-1  0.2065   
T  0.2329  T versus T-1: 3404.0537 
T+1  0.2342  T+1 versus T: 6.3094 
T+2  0.2484  T+2 versus T+1: 732.4843 
Russell 1000     
T-1  0.2132   
T  0.2396  T versus T-1: 3204.9781 
T+1  0.2399  T+1 versus T: 0.3072 
T+2  0.2501  T+2 versus T+1: 357.1576 
Russell 2000     
T-1  0.2614   
T  0.2599  T versus T-1: 6.4734 
T+1  0.2306  T+1 versus T: 2866.8383 
T+2  0.2349  T+2 versus T+1: 66.2324 
 
 